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Citizenship rights are associated with better economic opportunities 
for immigrants. This paper studies how in a country with a large 
fraction of temporary migrants the fertility decisions of foreign  
citizens respond to a change in the rules that regulate child legal 
status at birth. The introduction of birthright citizenship in Germany 
in 2000, represented a positive shock to the returns to investment 
in child human capital. Consistent with Becker’s “quality-quantity” 
model of fertility, we find that birthright citizenship leads to a 
reduction in immigrant fertility and an improvement in health and 
socio-emotional outcomes for the children affected by the reform.  (JEL J13, J15, J16, J24)
Migration policies can have a significant impact on immigrants’ opportunities in the host country. When entitled to citizenship, immigrants are both more 
likely to perform better in the labor market and be more integrated into the native 
culture. This paper exploits the introduction of birthright citizenship in Germany 
to isolate the effect of legal status at birth on immigrants’ fertility decisions and to 
test whether the behavioral responses we observe are consistent with the predictions 
provided by the theoretical literature.
Evidence from many Western countries shows that immigrant women, on average, 
have more children than the natives. Although the difference has declined in recent 
years, mostly as a consequence of the generalized drop in fertility (see Blau et al. 2008 
for the United States and Mayer and Riphahn 2000 for Germany), the gap between 
immigrants’ and natives’ fertility is wide. These differential fertility patterns are often 
perceived as a threat to local traditional values and national identity not only by the 
public opinion, but also by politicians (Sarrazin 2010) and scholars (Huntington 2004).
In this paper, we show how a particular migration policy, namely the German 
citizenship law, affects immigrants’ fertility choices. With the 2000 nationality law, 
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Germany shifted from a right of blood to a birthright system.1 Before 2000, the chil-
dren of immigrants could acquire German citizenship through naturalization at the 
age of 18, upon complying with the requirement of 8 years of residency in Germany, 
and after relinquishing their parents’ citizenship. After 2000, children born to immi-
grant parents are granted German citizenship at birth if at least 1 parent has legally 
resided in Germany for at least 8 years, and are allowed to maintain dual citizenship 
up to the age of 23.
Citizenship provides unrestricted access to the host country labor market, and 
evidence from many countries shows that immigrants who naturalize earn more than 
those who do not.2 Nevertheless, immigrants often do not take advantage of the pos-
sibility to naturalize, since this requires them to relinquish their former citizenship 
in many countries.3 Under the new regime, immigrants’ children born in Germany 
(unlike their parents) have an extended period of time to enjoy dual citizenship and 
to decide which country’s citizenship to adopt.
Even if willing to relinquish their former citizenship, some immigrants might find 
the residence requirements for naturalization too difficult to meet. Many migrate 
only for a limited period of time, and temporary (as opposed to permanent) migra-
tion has increased over time.4 Uncertainty about the length of stay in the host coun-
try is therefore likely to affect parental perceptions about the ability of their children 
to comply with the naturalization requirements. While returns on schooling and 
health investments are higher for citizen than noncitizen children, children’s failure 
to meet the naturalization requirements would reduce parental incentives to invest in 
their human capital. Under the birthright system, parents’ return plans have no effect 
on the newborn child’s legal status.
In the standard “quality-quantity” (Q-Q) framework (see Becker and Lewis 1973; 
Becker and Tomes 1976) citizenship at birth can be interpreted as a reduction in the 
price of child “quality.” The shock driven by citizenship acquisition should translate 
into an improvement in the child “quality” level and ultimately a decrease in the 
optimal number of children, since an increase in quality causes a rise of the shadow 
price of quantity.5
In the first part of this paper, we study how the legal status of prospective children 
affects immigrants’ fertility. In order to identify the effect of birthright citizenship, 
1 Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) provide an extensive analysis of the determinants and the evolution of citizenship 
laws in the post-World War II period.
2 See Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002) for the US, DeVoretz and Pivnenko (2004) for Canada, and Bevelander 
and Veenman (2006) for the Netherlands. Fougere and Safi (2009) finds that naturalized immigrants in France are 
more likely to find a job than nonnaturalized ones. Steinhardt (2008) finds that average wages for naturalized 
immigrants in Germany are 6 percent higher than the wages paid to foreign workers. His findings also show that 
naturalization leads to an immediate increase in wages, and also to higher returns from work experience.
3 Mazzolari (2009) shows, for the United States, that immigrants from five Latin American countries were 
significantly more likely to naturalize after their home-country governments allowed for dual citizenship and, as a 
result, improved their labor market outcomes.
4 In 2006, for example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries 
received 2.5 million temporary migrants, about three times the number of permanent migrants (Dumont 2008).
5 Becoming a citizen at birth might represent not just an economic shock; immigrants might perceive that natives 
are more willing to accept their citizen children, and, as a consequence, might decide to assimilate more. A recent 
strand of literature emphasizes the role of cultural traits as an important determinant of fertility behavior (see, 
among others, Fernandez and Fogli 2009 and Almond, Edlund, and Milligan 2009). Therefore, a reduction in fertil-
ity might reflect cultural convergence of immigrants to natives’ patterns.
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we exploit the main provision of the law passed by the German Parliament in May 
1999: a child born to foreign parents on January 1, 2000 or after, is granted citizen-
ship at birth if at least one parent has been ordinarily resident in Germany for at 
least eight years. In this setting, households composed of foreign parents who have 
resided in Germany for eight or more years represent the treatment group. We can 
define two comparison groups: the first includes all households where there is only 
one foreign parent, the second includes all households where there is no foreign 
parent. By comparing the fertility behavior of households in the treatment group 
with those in the two comparison groups, before and after the reform, in a stan-
dard difference-in-differences specification, we can identify how the introduction of 
birthright citizenship affects fertility.
Our results suggest a negative and significant effect of birthright citizenship on 
immigrants’ fertility. In households affected by the reform, the fertility—as defined 
by the probability of having a child born within the last 12 months—drops by 7 per-
cent of a standard deviation. In order to test whether the introduction of citizenship 
at birth is associated with an improvement in child quality, we study whether chil-
dren affected by the reform display better health and socio-emotional outcomes. We 
find that the obesity gap between noncitizens’ and citizens’ children at preschool 
age drops significantly for children born in 2000 or immediately afterward, com-
pared to those born immediately before 2000. Our results also show that children 
affected by the reform display better noncognitive development outcomes.
There are different ways through which immigrant parents might contribute to 
improve their children’s quality. For instance, parents might change their saving/con-
sumption decisions, increasing child related expenditure. They might decide to move 
to less segregated residential areas, where their children can attend better schools and 
have closer connections with German natives. Parents might also decide to improve 
their own levels of assimilation within the German culture, thus reducing the assimi-
lation cost for their children. Finally, parents might change their time allocation deci-
sions, devoting more attention to their children. We find some suggestive evidence 
to support the last mechanism, as we find that mothers of children affected by the 
reform reduce their labor supply and spend more time taking care of their children.
To our knowledge this is the first paper to provide quantitative evidence on the 
effect of migration policies on immigrants’ fertility. We contribute to the recent strand 
in the economic literature on the effect of legal status on individual behavior. Avitabile, 
Clots-Figueras, and Masella (2013), based on another provision of the 2000 German 
nationality law, find that a change in child legal status increased the propensity of 
parents to engage in social contacts with Germans and use the German language. 
The present study adds to this literature showing that child legal status at birth not 
only affects attitudes but also affects the economically relevant behavior of parents.6
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we describe the German nation-
ality reform and outline the benefits of German citizenship, then we discuss two 
simple theoretical frameworks. In Section II, we present the empirical strategy and 
the data. In Section III, we report the main results for fertility and discuss potential 
6 Mastrobuoni and Pinotti (2010) argue that crime rates among Romanian immigrants in Italy decreased as a 
result of the economic opportunities related to their new status as EU citizens.
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confoundings. In Section IV, we provide evidence that cohorts of immigrants chil-
dren affected by the reform display better health and socio-emotional outcomes. In 
Section V, we provide a discussion of our results. Section VI concludes.
I. Background
A. The German nationality reform
In May 1999, the German Parliament amended the Citizenship and Nationality 
Law of 1913. The main objective of the reform was the introduction of birthright 
citizenship for children born in Germany to foreign parents, but the law also intro-
duced changes to the naturalization criteria and explicitly denied dual citizenship 
for immigrants who naturalize. In this paper, the main focus is on the introduc-
tion of birthright citizenship, although we test whether the other provisions affect 
our results.
Before the reform, a child born in Germany was granted German citizenship at 
birth only if at least one parent was a German citizen at the time of its birth.7 Under 
the new regime, a child born in Germany to foreign parents on January 1, 2000 or 
after is granted citizenship at birth if two conditions are satisfied: (i) at least one 
parent has been ordinarily resident in Germany for eight years, and (ii) if at least 
one parent has been granted permanent right of residence. The child is then granted 
dual citizenship up to the age of 23, when he or she must decide which to retain. 
This is known as the options modell.8 This clause represented an exception under 
the framework introduced by the new nationality law that explicitly denied dual 
citizenship. Under the old regime dual citizenship was not legally recognized and 
granted only on a discretionary basis. Anil (2006) reports anecdotal evidence sug-
gesting that the German officialdom generally was unwilling to entertain the idea of 
dual citizenship.
Unlike the citizenship at birth provision, the policy for naturalization for adults 
underwent various changes in the years before the reform. Laws affecting natural-
ization applications were passed in 1990 and 1993. The changes involved limited 
discretion of officials to deny naturalization, and foreigners’ legal rights to claim 
entitlement to naturalization. After 1993, foreigners aged between 16 and 23 years 
with 8 or more years of residency, and foreigners over the age of 23 with a minimum 
of 15 years of residency, had a legal claim to naturalization. From 2000 onward, 
the requirement became eight years also for the older age group, but naturalization 
was no longer based exclusively on residence. Applicants for naturalization were 
required also to: express loyalty to the German Constitution, be able to support 
themselves and their family without social security or  unemployment benefits, have 
a clean criminal record, have proven adequate command of the German language, 
and renounce former citizenship.
7 In the case that only the father was a German citizen, citizenship was dependent on recognition or determina-
tion of paternity under German law.
8 The reform also includes a transitional provision for children aged under ten years on January 1, 2000 with foreign 
parents. These children were granted naturalization upon application (to be completed before December 31, 2000) if at 
least one parent had been ordinarily resident in Germany for at least eight years at the time of the child’s birth.
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B. The Benefits of German Citizenship at Birth
This section describes the benefits of German citizenship and analyzes the advan-
tages of its being granted at birth rather than later in life. First, obtaining a German 
passport has labor market benefits. In Germany, there are several careers that 
require ownership of a German passport.9 There are also restrictions on access to 
careers in other administrative departments, but most do not apply to EU citizens.10 
Steinhardt (2008) provides evidence that naturalized immigrants are more likely to 
be employed in white collar occupations. In addition, the possibility to travel with-
out restriction within the EU has significantly increased the advantages of an EU 
passport for individuals employed in occupations that require unrestricted mobility 
and no bureaucratic hurdles. Employment of EU citizens often leads to a reduction 
in the costs to employers, as there is no need for visas or other special administrative 
permits. Obtaining a German passport has some other noneconomic benefits. As in 
most countries, citizenship endows the right to vote in general and in local elections. 
Other advantages include the possibility to obtain visas for relatives and legal pro-
tection in the case of criminal charges.
To the best of our knowledge, acquiring German citizenship does not provide 
immigrants with better access to the main welfare programs. For instance, citizen-
ship status does not affect the eligibility criteria for insurance-based unemployment 
benefits and unemployment assistance. Eligibility for social assistance is also inde-
pendent of citizenship (Riphahn, Sander, and Wunder 2013). Similarly, there are 
no differences between citizens and noncitizens in the rules that regulate access to 
healthcare, kindergartens, and child daycare centers (Federal Office for Migration 
and Refugees in Germany).
Before the introduction of the nationality law in 2000, German citizenship could 
be obtained through naturalization, marriage, or adoption, the first one being the most 
common route. The award of citizenship at birth rather than through naturalization as 
an adult has three main advantages: (i) the possibility to hold dual citizenship; (ii) no 
uncertainty related to possible changes in the rules on naturalization; and (iii) no 
uncertainty driven by the return migration decisions of parents. We explain these 
three types of benefits in more detail. Before the reform, foreigners over 16 years 
of age, in principle, were eligible for German citizenship if they had spent at least 
8 years in Germany since their birth. In practice, children born to immigrant parents 
had to wait until age 18 in order to become Germans (provided that they met all the 
residency requirements).11 Children born in 2000 or after to households where at 
least 1 parent had been a resident in Germany for 8 years, were entitled to hold dual 
citizenship at birth and until the age of 23 (options modell ), when they are sup-
posed to choose nationality. This allowance represents a notable exception in the new 
9 In the public sector, most careers in the justice and national defense departments are accessible only to German 
citizens, irrespective of ownership of a passport from another EU member state.
10 In the private sector, professions such as dentistry, medicine, pharmacy, law, and architecture are restricted to 
citizens from EU countries.
11 The legal age for relinquishing former citizenship was 18, and dual citizenship was not allowed. Parents, in 
principle, could cancel the citizenship of their children, but only if they had formally resigned their own former 
citizenship.
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 institutional framework. Before 2000 dual citizenship was not legally recognized and 
was rarely tolerated. After 2000 it was explicitly denied by law—with the exception 
for those below age 23 explained above—and immigrants had to relinquish their 
original citizenship in order to become German citizens. Relinquishing birth country 
citizenship might imply some psychological costs for immigrants and is associated 
with serious limitations in their country of origin.12 Individuals with dual nationality 
also, in principle, have unrestricted access to two labor markets.13
Acquiring citizenship at birth neutralizes two sources of uncertainty inherent in 
the possibility of naturalization later in life. First, it negates any uncertainty about 
possible changes in the institutional setting. While the norms approved in 1990 and 
1993 introduced rule-based criteria for the acquisition of citizenship through natu-
ralization, thus making it easier, a law passed in 1997 set out visa requirements for 
unaccompanied children from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, Morocco, and Tunisia, 
and required existing resident children of parents from these countries to apply for 
residence permits (Bosswick 2000). Repeated changes in institutional arrangements 
may have increased immigrants’ uncertainty about the timing of citizenship acquisi-
tion via naturalization for their children.
Second, and most important, birthright citizenship makes the child’s legal status 
independent of household return migration decisions. As already mentioned, after 
1993 children born to immigrant parents and seeking naturalization had to provide 
evidence of at least eight years of ordinary residence in Germany.14 Immigrants to 
Germany are very likely to return home either permanently or temporarily. Using infor-
mation on the return migration intentions elicited from the German  Socio-Economic 
Panel, the graph in Figure 1 shows that more than 60 percent of immigrants might 
return to their home country at some point, and about 45 percent of them are willing 
to return within 8 years. This evidence is suggestive that a large fraction of immi-
grants might indeed perceive the possibility to stay in Germany long enough to allow 
their children to meet the residence requirements as very unlikely. After the reform, 
the return plans of parents do not affect the legal position of the newborn.15
Returns to schooling and health investments are, on average, higher for citizen than 
noncitizen children. While the Microcensus does not elicit information on wages, we 
use data on annual gross income, and we find that the magnitude of the correlation 
between completion of tertiary education and annual gross income is  significantly 
larger for naturalized immigrants than nonnaturalized ones. During the period pre-
dating the reform of the nationality law, parents who were not planning to stay in 
Germany long enough to enable their children to meet the residence  requirements 
might have been less inclined to invest in their children’s human capital. Under the 
12 Mueller (2006) reports that pre-1996, Turkish regulation deprived individuals of their property rights in 
Turkey if they abandoned Turkish citizenship.
13 Mazzolari (2009) exploits the introduction of dual citizenship in five Central and South American countries to 
show that immigrants from these countries experienced a large increase in the probability of acquiring US citizen-
ship and, as a result, display better labor market outcomes.
14 According to Section 12b of the German Nationality Act, in the presence of interruptions longer than six 
months, a previous period of residence in Germany might not be counted as contributing toward the duration of 
residence requirement, and if it were allowed, it would only be up to a period of five years.
15 There is increasing evidence for Germany on the relationship between return migration intentions and invest-
ments in both cultural and economic integration (see Dustmann 1999; Dustmann and Mestres 2011).
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birthright system, uncertainty about the parental return-migration decision does not 
affect either childrens’ ability to acquire German citizenship or its timing.
C. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we discuss two simple theoretical frameworks describing how 
child legal status can affect both fertility and human capital investment decisions.
The effect of birthright citizenship on immigrants’ fertility and child health out-
comes can be modeled in a standard “quality-quantity” model (see Becker and Lewis 
1973; Becker and Tomes 1976). Parents maximize a utility function u(n, q, c) that 
depends on n; the number of children, q; the “quality” per child; and c, the con-
sumption rate of all other commodities. Agents face a nonlinear budget constraint: 
Y = n p n + nqp + q p q + c p c . Quality and quantity enter into the budget constraint in 
a multiplicative way. The cost of an increase in quality is higher the larger the number 
of children because it will apply to more units.  p n is the unitary cost of the number of 
children that is not dependent on quality, for instance, the opportunity cost of fertil-
ity control; p represents the cost of child quality that depends on the total number of 
children;  p q is the unitary cost of child quality that does not depend on quantity; and 
p c is the price of the consumption good. We can interpret the German nationality law 
reform and the extension of the citizenship rights as a decrease in the price of child 
quality,  p q . A decrease in  p q , as explained by Becker and Lewis (1973, S283), has a 
positive direct effect on child quality q and a negative indirect effect on the number of 
children n, due to the increase in the shadow price of quantity (  p n + qp).
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Figure 1. Return Probability
notes: The dotted line is the proportion of immigrants who claimed they might return to their home country at some 
point, by survey year. The solid line is the proportion of those who plan to return within eight years with respect to 
the total number of those who might return, by survey year. 
source: German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP)
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Citizenship rights at birth can also be interpreted as a positive shock to children’s 
endowments (their characteristics) at birth. While a general theoretical model is 
beyond the scope of this work, we sketch a simple framework that departs from 
Becker and Lewis (1973) to incorporate the child’s endowments, and illustrate the 
assumptions that translate extension of citizenship rights into lower fertility rates 
and a higher level of child “quality.” Simplifying assumptions are introduced in 
order to generate easily testable implications.
The average quality of children within a household can be modeled as a standard 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of the average level of children’s 
endowments at birth, e, and parental per child investment in quality, i, and assume 
that parents invest the same amount of resources in each of their children.16 The util-
ity function is defined as u = γ ln c +  ( 1 − γ )  ( ln n + ln q(e; i ) ) , where c, n, and 
q are defined as above. Parents choose n, i, and c to maximize their utility function 
under a budget constraint that includes total expenditure on investment in child qual-
ity, total expenditure on the consumption good, and the child costs that depend on 
quantity but not quality, that is Y = c p c + ni p i + n p n , where  p c and  p n are defined 
as above and  p i represents the price of per child parental investment in child quality. 
If investment and endowment are complements in the quality production function,17 
that is, if the elasticity of substitution between a child’s initial endowment and 
parental investment is smaller than one, a positive shock to the child’s endowment 
translates into an increase in the marginal product of investment in quality, and, 
therefore, in per child level of investment. The subsequent increase in the shadow 
price of quantity (i p i +  p n ) explains the decrease in the optimal number of children.
The two theoretical frameworks presented above are clearly very close and have 
similar implications. Empirically, it is hard to distinguish between a shock in endow-
ments from a change in the price of child quality. In the rest of the paper we refer 
generically to the introduction of birthright citizenship as a shock in the return to 
investment in child human capital.
II. Empirical Strategy and Data
A. Empirical strategy
We study how the provision that introduced birthright citizenship affects immi-
grants’ fertility. According to the new German nationality law, effective from 
January 1, 2000, all children born in 2000 or after to non-Germans will be granted 
German citizenship if at least one parent has been legally residing in the country 
for at least eight years at the time of the child’s birth. In our setting, individuals 
born to  noncitizen parents, at least one of whom has lived in Germany for eight or 
more years, represent the treatment group. There were no changes in the conditions 
for children born to parents at least one of whom was a German citizen at the time 
16 In Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976), the quality that enters parents’ utility function is 
assumed to be the same for all children.
17 The assumption of complementarity is supported by findings in the empirical literature (Datar, Kilburn, and 
Loughran 2010; Gelber and Isen 2013; Aizer and Cuhna 2011) that provide evidence that parental investment rein-
forces the child’s initial endowments.
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of the birth, since they automatically received German citizenship. This allows the 
identification of two comparison groups: first, households where only one (poten-
tial) parent is a non-German citizen (from here on referred to as mixed households 
or Comparison Group I); second, households where none of the (potential) parents 
is a foreigner (from here on referred to as Comparison Group II).18 By comparing 
the outcomes of the treatment and the two comparison groups before and after the 
reform, we can identify the effect of the birthright citizenship reform on parental out-
comes. Formally, we estimate the following difference-in-differences (DD) model:
(1)  Y it = α +  β 1 C i 1 +  β 2 C i 2 +  β 3 pos t t +  β 4 C i 1 × pos t t +  β 5 C i 2 × pos t t 
  +  β 6 C i 1 × t +  β 7 C i 2 × t + γ  X it ′ +  μ t +  u it ,
where  Y it denotes the fertility outcome of the woman in couple i at time t.  C i 1 takes 
the value 1 if in household i only one parent is a foreign citizen.  C i 2 takes the value 
1 if in household i there is no foreign parent. In this specification, immigrant house-
holds where neither parent is a German citizen, but at least one has been in Germany 
for eight or more years, are the reference category. Because of the biological lag 
between fertility planning decisions and actual outcomes, we treat as postreform 
period (pos t t = 1) all the surveys from 2001 onward. pos t t takes the value zero for 
all surveys before 2001. In the baseline specification,  X it includes a set of women- 
specific characteristics, namely age, dummies for educational attainment, dum-
mies for state of residence, and dummies for being German or a citizen of another 
European Union member state. In this specification, being a citizen of a non-EU 
state acts as reference category.  μ t represents a set of year dummies. The baseline 
specification also includes group-specific linear trends.
The parameters of interest are  β 4 and  β 5 . Since the omitted category in equa-
tion (1) is the dummy that denotes the treatment group,  β 4 and  β 5 measure how the 
fertility, respectively, of mixed households and households where there is no foreign 
parent change in comparison to the treatment group after the reform. Standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at group/year level in order to account for the possibility 
of shocks differentially affecting the three groups in a particular year.
Immigrant couples who have been in Germany for less than eight years might also 
provide a counterfactual for the fertility behavior of couples affected by the citizen-
ship reform. Although they might be more comparable to couples in the treatment 
group, they might also be partially affected by the reform. Indeed, when deciding 
the optimal family size, they might take into account that future children will enjoy 
German citizenship if born once one of the spouses has fulfilled the eight year resi-
dency requirement. We discuss these issues more extensively in online Appendix 2, 
where we also present results obtained using such alternative comparison group.
We next test whether the introduction of birthright citizenship is associated with 
an improvement in child quality for the cohorts of children affected by the reform. 
When studying the effect of family size on child quality, previous work has focused 
on education (Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009; Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser 2010) 
18 For consistency throughout the paper, we will refer to actual or potential parents simply as parents.
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or on anthropometric outcomes (Rosenzweig and Zhang 2009). Unfortunately the 
short time period after the reform does not allow us to test the effect of the reform 
on educational outcomes. Instead, we study how anthropometric outcomes, as elic-
ited in the Microcensus, and measures of noncognitive and behavioral development, 
as obtained in the KiGGs data, changed as a result of citizenship being acquired at 
birth. We do not try to attribute causal interpretations to the relationship between 
citizenship rights and child quality since the negative effect of the reform on the 
fertility decisions of immigrants might generate a selection bias. Parents who decide 
not to try to have a child after 2000, as a result of the reform, may be the same par-
ents who would have invested less in their child’s development.19
In order to assess the effect of birthright citizenship on child quality, we exploit 
the fact that both for anthropometric measures in the Microcensus and noncogni-
tive outcomes in the KiGGs, we have information on child cohorts born before and 
after the citizenship reform. Nevertheless, being born after 2000 should make a 
difference only in the quality outcomes of children born to immigrant parents who 
have been in Germany for eight or more years, but not of children with at most one 
foreign parent. Formally, we estimate a child-specific version of equation (1) where 
the dependent variables are child quality outcomes:
(2)   Q ict = α +  β 1 C i 1 +  β 2 C i 2 +  β 3 d c +  β 4 d c ×  C i 1 
  +  β 5 d c ×  C i 2 + γ X it ′ +  η c +  μ t +  u ict .
 Q ict is the quality health outcome of a child born to a couple i and belonging to 
cohort  c.  C i 1 and  C i 2 are defined as above.  d c is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the child was born in 2000 or afterward (c >= 2,000).  η c and  μ t represent child 
birth cohort and time fixed effects, respectively.  X it includes age and gender of the 
child, and characteristics of the mother in household i, namely age, dummies for 
educational attainment, dummies for state of residence, and dummies for being 
German citizen or citizen of another European Union member state.20 Standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at group/cohort level.
In this case,  β 4 ( β 5 ) larger than zero would be consistent with the  “quality-quantity” 
model. Indeed, we would expect that, compared to children born in households where 
at least one of the parents is a German citizen, immigrants’ children born in 2000 or 
afterward may have better development outcomes than those born before 2000. This 
is the case because the reform may have increased the returns to investment in child 
human capital.
B. data
In this study we use three different data sources. The main data are from the German 
Microcensus, which is a household-based repeated cross-section survey carried out 
19 Under certain assumptions, it is possible to provide a lower bound estimate of the effect of the reform on child 
health driven by increased parental investment. We present the results for this exercise in Appendix B.
20 In line with the specification in equation (1), being a citizen of a non-EU state acts as an omitted category.
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by the German Statistical Office. The survey covers 1 percent of all households in 
Germany with approximately 370,000 households and 820,000 persons interviewed 
every year. The primary goal of the Microcensus is to collect information on the struc-
ture of the German population and its labor market behavior. The survey started in 
1973 and was conducted every two years until 1995. Since 1995 it has been annual.
Information on citizenship status has been collected since 1996. Since this infor-
mation is crucial for our analysis, we consider only those surveys between 1996 and 
2005. The Microcensus provides detailed information on country of birth, citizen-
ship, and the year of arrival of the immigrant, thus, allowing us to define the group 
of households that is affected by the changes in citizenship rules.
Our sample includes all households where either the head of household’s partner 
or the household head is a woman aged 15–49. For each individual in the household, 
including children, we know the year of birth. In order to identify the effect of the 
reform on fertility, we use two different types of information. First, using informa-
tion on year of birth of each household member, we define a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if in the household there is a child born within the last 12 months. 
This is our main dependent variable. Since mothers are asked for information on 
the age structure of all the children living in the household, we can construct mea-
sures for the total number of children in different age groups (0–3, 6–9, and 9 years 
or above), and for the probability of having at least one child in each age group. 
Information on fertility outcomes was collected in each survey between 1996 and 
2005.21 Table  1 reports descriptive statistics for the household characteristics of 
the three groups as elicited in 1999, the year in which the new nationality law was 
approved. Mothers in the treatment group are, on average, about the same age as 
those in the group where none of the parents is a foreigner, but they are almost 
3 years older than those in the mixed households group (36.4 versus 33.6). Mothers 
in the treatment group are less educated than those in the two comparison groups. 
On average, the number of children born to immigrant households (1.56) is higher 
than the number of children born in mixed (0.86) and German (0.90) households.
The Microcensus also reports information on body weight (in kg) and height (in 
centimeters), but it was collected only in three surveys: 1999, 2003, and 2005. The 
literature suggests that Body Mass Index (BMI) is a reliable measure of child health 
for children older than three years. We focus on preschool age children (four and 
five years) and we use two dependent variables: BMI index, and a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not the child is obese. Obesity is defined using cutoff points 
varying by age and gender, recommended by the Childhood Obesity Working Group 
of the International Obesity Task force.
The second data source is the “German Health Interview and Examination 
Survey for Children and Adolescents” (henceforth, KiGGs), which is a compre-
hensive, Germany-wide, representative interview and examination survey for the 
age group 0–17 years. Between May 2003 and May 2006, 17,641 study participants 
were enrolled. The sampling consisted of a two-stage procedure. First, 167 primary 
sample units (PSU) were drawn from an inventory of German  communities. Second, 
21 Given that we do not have complete fertility histories, we cannot rule out that our results can be explained, at 
least partially, by the postponement in the timing of births.
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24 addresses for each child birth cohort were randomly selected from local popula-
tion registries within selected PSUs. The sampling structure and the fact that the sur-
vey was spanned over a period of three years allow us to compare the socio-emotional 
outcomes of children with the same age, but belonging to different cohorts. The data 
contain objective measures of mental health as well as  parent-reported information 
regarding the socio-emotional development of their children.22 Although the data 
on parental socio-demographic characteristics are not exhaustive, the KiGGs elic-
its information on nationality, country of birth, and year of immigration of both 
parents. In order to allow comparisons of the development status of immigrant and 
nonimmigrant children, the survey oversamples households with migrants status.
The third data source is the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), which is 
the longest-running longitudinal survey of private households and persons in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. It started in 1984 and is conducted every year. It 
 provides  representative microdata on individuals and households. Each individual 
in the relevant household aged over 15 is interviewed. The household head  provides 
22 For children six years old or older, the KiGGs also collects data on cognitive outcomes. Because of the age 
bracket, there is no information available for children born after the new citizenship law was introduced.
Table 1—Sample Characteristics in 1999
Treatment
group
Mean/SD
Comparison
group I
Mean/SD
Comparison
group II
Mean/SD
(1) (2) (3)
Age mother 36.394 33.615 36.183
(8.177) (8.388) (7.845)
Mother has primary education 0.216 0.054 0.009
(0.412) (0.225) (0.092)
Mother has secondary education 0.506 0.238 0.145
(0.500) (0.426) (0.352)
Mother has tertiary education 0.244 0.678 0.826
(0.429) (0.467) (0.379)
Mother self-employed 0.017 0.044 0.042
(0.131) (0.205) (0.200)
Mother unemployed 0.071 0.089 0.073
(0.257) (0.285) (0.261)
Mother is German 0.000 0.305 1.000
(0.000) (0.460) (0.000)
Mother is EU 0.209 0.209 0.000
(0.407) (0.407) (0.000)
log HH Income 2.707 2.580 2.970
(1.136) (1.597) (1.586)
Total number of children 1.560 0.856 0.902
(1.233) (1.008) (1.005)
Observations 2,574 4,765 83,286
notes: The sample includes households where the woman is in the age group 15–49. The treat-
ment group contains households where at least one partner has lived in Germany for eight 
or more years. Comparison group I contains households where only parent is a foreigner. 
Comparison group II contains households with no foreign parent. Summary statistics are com-
puted using the 1999 survey. By construction, the mother is never German in the treatment 
group and is always German in the second comparison group.
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 information on children under the age of 15. The dataset contains detailed  information 
on country of origin and arrival date of immigrants, and family composition. In each 
survey foreign born individuals are asked about their citizenship status. On average, 
12,000 households and 24,000 individuals have been interviewed every year since 
1996. The survey contains quite detailed information on time usage. Both the head 
of the household and his partner are asked how many hours they spend, on average, 
every weekday on each activity of work outside the household, child care, house-
hold work, care of people in need, educational activities, and shopping. We created 
a variable for the number of hours of child care in an average working day.
III. The Effect of Child Legal Status on Fertility
A. Baseline results
We present evidence of the demographic consequences of the German nation-
ality law reform by plotting the evolution over time of the fertility behavior of 
the three groups defined in the previous section. Figure 2 displays the fraction of 
women (aged 15–49) with a child born within the previous 12 months, during the 
time period 1996 to 2005, for each of the three groups. A birth within the previous 
year is significantly more likely in households in the treatment group (on average 
8.5 percent of the households in the treatment group experienced a new birth in 2000 
or before) than in households in the two comparison groups; before the reform the 
average probability of having a child of age zero is about 6.5 percent (4 percent) for 
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
Figure 2. Probability of Having a Child Less Than 12 Months Old
notes: The graphic plots the fraction of women (aged 15–49) with a child less than 12 months old, by year and 
group. The circles denote the treatment group; the diamonds the comparison group of households with only one for-
eign parent; the squares the comparison group where none of the parents is a foreign citizen. 
source: German Microcensus
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women belonging to households where only one (no) parent is a foreigner citizen. In 
2001, one year after the reform became effective, the fraction of women within the 
treatment group who gave birth within the previous 12 months drops to 7 percent. 
The fertility behavior in the two comparison groups does not display, on average, 
any significant change after the reform.23
Table 2 reports the estimates of  β 4 and  β 5 in equation (1). The two coefficients 
capture how the fertility of the households belonging to each of the two compari-
son groups defined above changes with respect to the treatment group, after the 
reform. The panels report the results for the three dependent variables discussed in 
the data section. In panel A, the dependent variable is the main variable of interest, 
the dummy for a child born in the previous 12 months. Column 1 presents the esti-
mates for equation (1) with no control variables and no time dummies. In this case, 
the size of the two coefficients provides an exact measure of the drop observed in 
Figure 2. Note that the fact that the two coefficients are positive indicates that the 
difference between the fertility levels of the treatment and the comparison groups 
decreased after the reform. We gradually introduce year dummies, group-specific 
linear trends and the control variables specified in Section IIA. In each specifica-
tion, we find a significant negative effect of the reform on the fertility outcomes of 
households where both spouses are immigrants and not German citizens. Column 5 
shows the results for the baseline specification, which controls for the woman’s age 
and includes dummies for secondary and tertiary education, for being a German 
citizen or citizen of an EU member state, for federal state of residence, year, and 
group specific linear trends.24
Irrespective of the specification considered, the effect is sizeable and in line 
with the one documented in Figure 2. Households in the treatment group are about 
1 percentage point less likely to have experienced a new birth within the previous 
12 months as a result of the German nationality reform. The effect of the reform 
corresponds to a 7 percent standard deviation of the dependent variable and slightly 
above 15 percent of the mean for the treatment group in the prereform period. In 
panel B of Table 2, we estimate equation (1) using as dependent variable the dummy 
variable equal to 1 if there is at least one child younger than 3 years of age in the 
household. The results are consistent with those presented in panel A. The effect 
of the reform is roughly 14 percent of the mean of the dependent variable within 
treated households. The conclusions are similar when we look at the number of chil-
dren younger than three years of age (panel C). Overall, Table 2 presents evidence of 
a decline in the fertility of immigrants caused by the German nationality law reform. 
In online Appendix  A, we present and discuss results based on the specification 
that uses immigrants with less than eight years of residence in Germany as alterna-
tive control group. While the smaller sizes of the samples considered are likely to 
23 In Figure 2, the trends for the three groups before the reform do not look exactly parallel, and this is argu-
ably related to the limited number of observations for the treatment and the first comparison group. In column 4 of 
Table 2, we present a specification that introduces group linear trends precisely to control for this issue.
24 The results do not change when we use richer specifications that control for household income, total number 
of children, and the number of years of residence in Germany. Similarly, the results of the probit specifications 
are in line with those in panels A and B. Moreover, when we cluster at group-federal state level to control for the 
possibility of serial correlation, the levels of significance are in line with those for the result presented in Table 2.
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explain the higher standard errors, the point estimates are perfectly in line with those 
presented here.
As argued in Section IB the economic benefits of German citizenship are substan-
tially larger for non-EU than for EU citizens. If the reduction in fertility documented 
above is driven by an increase in the returns to children’s human capital, we would 
expect a sharper decrease in fertility among households where neither parent has EU 
citizenship, since the increase in the returns to human capital of prospective children 
will be larger for this group. In order to test this hypothesis, we split the treatment 
group into two subgroups: households where neither parent has EU citizenship and 
Table 2—Fertility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
panel A. newborn child
Comparison group I −0.020*** −0.020*** −0.037*** −0.422 −0.612
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (2.493) (2.036)
Comparison group II −0.043*** −0.043*** −0.077*** 2.052 1.762
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (1.928) (1.726)
Comparison group I × after 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013* 0.011*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006)
Comparison group II × after 0.009** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.014** 0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
After −0.013***
(0.003)
Time dummies X X X X
Group trends X X
Controls X X
Observations 94,1586
Mean of dep. variable 0.040
SD of dep. variable 0.197
panel B. probability of at least one child younger than three years old
Comparison group I −0.061*** −0.061*** −0.107*** −1.445 −1.995
(0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (5.739) (4.543)
Comparison group II −0.110*** −0.110*** −0.197*** 4.779 4.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (4.641) (3.750)
Comparison group I × after 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.039** 0.034**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.019) (0.015)
Comparison group II × after 0.014** 0.015** 0.015*** 0.027* 0.026**
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.015) (0.012)
After −0.021***
(0.007)
Time dummies X X X X
Group trends X X
Controls X X
Observations 94,1586
Mean of dep.variable 0.118
SD of dep. variable 0.322
(Continued )
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households where at least one parent has EU citizenship. In the latter case, the new-
born child will also be a EU citizen. In columns 1–2 in Table 3, we show that only 
households where neither parent has EU citizenship experienced a decline in the 
probability of having a child within the last 12 months, while the effect is basically 
null for households where at least 1 parent is an EU citizen.
B. potential Confounders
We first examine the possibility that our results are capturing the effect of the 
reform on the composition of the three groups, and in particular the age structure 
of the households in those groups rather than the effect of the reform on the fertil-
ity decisions of immigrants. The 2000 German nationality law may have induced a 
change in the composition of the treatment/comparison groups by affecting (i) the 
return migration decision of immigrant parents in the treatment group, (ii) their 
incentives to become naturalized, and (iii) the likelihood of observing assortative 
matching in the marriage market.
The incentive to leave Germany should be lower for parents in the treatment 
group who had a child after 2000. Since this child will have German citizenship 
Table 2—Fertility (Continued )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
panel C. number of children younger than three years old
Comparison group I −0.070*** −0.070*** −0.120*** −3.285 −3.878
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (6.267) (4.877)
Comparison group II −0.125*** −0.125*** −0.222*** 3.859 2.988
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (4.760) (3.840)
Comparison group I × after 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.045*** 0.041* 0.035**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) (0.016)
Comparison group II × after 0.017** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.027* 0.026**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.015) (0.012)
After −0.025***
(0.007)
Time dummies X X X X
Group trends X X
Controls X X
Observations 94,1586
Mean of dep. variable 0.128
SD of dep. variable 0.365
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group-year level in parentheses. The sample includes households 
where the woman is in the age group 15–49. Comparison groups I and II are defined as in Table 1. The treatment 
groups are the reference category. Panel A’s dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a child born within 
the last 12 months. Panel B’s dependent variable is a dummy for whether there is at least one child younger than 
three years old. Panel C’s dependent variable is the number of children younger than three years old. After is a 
dummy equal to one for all the surveys from 2001 onward. The treatment group is the reference category. Controls 
include mother’s age, mother’s education dummies, state of residence dummies, and dummies for whether the 
mother is German or an EU citizen.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and supposedly will enjoy better opportunities in the German and European labor 
markets, they might decide to stay longer in Germany. While the evidence presented 
in Figure 1 does not seem to support the hypothesis that the reform changed the 
return intentions of immigrants living in Germany, a potential reduction in the return 
migration probability would bias down the size of the drop in fertility. In fact, if 
that is the case, after the reform, we should observe a higher fraction of immigrant 
households with a recently born child.
We then investigate whether the results in Table 2 are capturing the effects of 
changes in naturalization decisions. In the period between 1998 and 2003, the natu-
ralization rate in Germany was around 2 percent. We test whether groups affected 
differentially by changes in naturalization rules introduced by the 2000 nationality 
law show a different response in terms of fertility. As discussed in Section IA, on the 
one hand, the reform introduces less strict residency requirements for naturalization, 
since it lowers the minimum residency requirement from 15 years to 8 years. On 
the other hand, it includes the additional requirements described in Section IA. We 
split the treatment group into two samples: (i) households where at least 1 spouse 
has been a resident in Germany for more than 15 years at the time of the survey, and 
(ii) households where at least 1 spouse has been a resident in Germany for between 
8 and 15 years at the time of the survey. For households in the first sample, natural-
ization requirements have become stricter. Before the reform they had an uncondi-
tional entitlement to naturalization. Individuals in the second sample are allowed to 
Table 3—Heterogeneous Effects in Fertility
Newborn
 (1)
Newborn
(2)
Comparison group I −8.166*** 1.659
(2.624) (2.555)
Comparison group II −5.807** 4.001*
(2.367) (2.295)
Comparison group I × after −0.008 0.017**
(0.009) (0.007)
Comparison group II × after −0.006 0.019***
(0.008) (0.006)
Sample EU Not EU
Time dummies X X
Group trends X X
Controls X X
Observations 921,223 935,879
Mean of dep. variable 0.039 0.04
SD of dep. variable 0.195 0.197
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group-year level in parentheses. The sample 
includes households where the woman is in the age group 15–49. Comparison groups I and II 
are defined as in Table 1. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a child born 
within the last 12 months. Controls are the same as those defined in Table 2. Column 1 restricts 
the treatment group to couples where at least one of the parents is an EU citizen. Column 2 
restricts the treatment group to couples where none of the parents is an EU citizen.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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apply for naturalization after the reform. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show that there 
are no statically significant differences in the results for these two groups.25
The reform might also have decreased foreigners’ incentives to marry some-
one with German citizenship, thus, leading to increase of the fraction of marriages 
among noncitizens. This does not seem to be the case since we observe that the per-
centage of marriages where both spouses are foreign citizens stays constant before 
and after the reform (around 3 percent).
If our results are an artifact of changes in the sample composition, we may 
observe changes in the overall age composition of the household. We conduct two 
tests to rule out this possibility. First, we run the baseline specification including a 
full set of single year female age dummies, which controls for potential nonlinear 
effects of female age on fertility. The results are reported in column 2 of Table 5. 
The coefficients of interest are positive, significantly different from zero, and of very 
similar size to those in panel A in Table 2. Second, we assess whether there have 
been changes in the age composition of children not supposed to be affected by the 
reform. Since we observe fertility for a period of five years after the  introduction 
25 The size of the coefficients is larger for the sample of immigrant households where at least one parent has 
lived in Germany for between 8 and 15 years, which is consistent with this group including a higher fraction of 
women of reproductive age. At the baseline, the fertility rate for this group is about twice as high as that for the 
group that has been in Germany for more than 15 years.
Table 4—Other Provisions
Newborn
(1)
Newborn
(2)
Comparison group I −3.163 −1.869
(3.538) (2.243)
Comparison group II −0.802 0.495
(3.353) (1.950)
Comparison group I × after 0.020* 0.008
(0.011) (0.005)
Comparison group II × after 0.023** 0.011**
(0.011) (0.004)
Sample 8–15 years More 15 years
Time dummies X X
Group trends X X
Controls X X
Observations 921,797 935,305
Mean of dep. variable 0.027 0.027
SD of dep. variable 0.04 0.04
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group-year level in parentheses. The sample 
includes households where the woman is in the age group 15–49. Comparison groups I and II 
are defined as in Table 1. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a child born 
within the last 12 months. Controls are the same as those defined in Table 2. Column 1 includes 
households where none of the parents has spent more than 15 years in Germany and where at 
least 1 has spent between 8 and 15 years in Germany. Column 2 includes households where at 
least 1 of the parents has spent more than 15 years in Germany.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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of the new regime, we should not observe any change in the probability of hav-
ing a child aged over five years. For this purpose, we estimate the specification 
in equation (1) using as dependent variables (i) the probability of having a child 
aged between 6 and 9 years old, (ii) the number of children between 6 and 9 years, 
(iii) the probability of having a child aged 10–17, and (iv) the number of children 
10–17. The results in columns 3 to 6 of Table 5 show that  β 4 and  β 5 are negative and 
not significantly different from zero. Overall, the results of these tests do not sup-
port the hypothesis that the drop in fertility is an artifact of changes in the sample 
composition.
In order to rule out the possibility that our results might partly reflect differential 
trends across groups due to unobservable characteristics, we perform a standard 
robustness test. We consider only prereform surveys, and we assume that the reform 
was implemented in 1997, thus restricting the sample to the years prereform. We 
then redefine the postreform variable (pos t t ) as a dummy that takes the value zero 
for all surveys before 1998 and estimate the same specification as in equation (1). 
Table 5—Fertility: Potential Confounders
Newborn
(1)
Newborn
(2)
At least one 
child 6–9
(3)
Number of
children 6–9
(4)
At least one 
child 10–17
(5)
Number of
children 10–17
(6)
Comparison group I −6.700 −0.312 −2.251 −7.291 8.375 15.019
(4.377) (2.421) (6.042) (7.048) (5.348) (10.472)
Comparison group II −1.101 0.191 12.957** 10.996 16.404*** 25.773***
(3.839) (1.773) (5.729) (6.751) (4.032) (8.939)
Comparison group I −0.006
 × after 98 (0.005)
Comparison group IIs −0.005
 × after 98 (0.005)
Comparison group I 0.011* −0.007 −0.019 −0.017 −0.033
 × after (0.006) (0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.028)
Comparison group II 0.013** −0.009 −0.016 −0.016 −0.035
 × after (0.005) (0.015) (0.017) (0.011) (0.022)
Time dummies X X X X X X
Group trends X X X X X X
Controls X X X X X X
Mother age dummies X
Observations 479,632 941,586 941,586 941,586 941,586 941,586
Mean of dep. variable 0.043 0.04 0.174 0.200 0.3 0.411
SD of dep. variable 0.202 0.197 0.379 0.465 0.458 0.705
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group-year level in parentheses. The sample includes households 
where the woman is in the age group 15–49. Comparison groups I and II are defined as in Table 1. In columns 1 and 
2, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a child born within the last 12 months. In column 1, we 
restrict the sample to the years prereform, after 98 is a dummy equal to 1 for 1998 onward. In column 2 we control 
for mother’s single year age dummies. In column 3, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a child 
aged between 6 and 9 years old. In column 4, the dependent variable is the number of children aged between 6 and 
9 years old. In column 5, the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if there is a child aged between 10 and 17 
years old. In column 6, the dependent variable is the number of children aged between 10 and 17 years old. Controls 
are the same as those defined in Table 2.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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If our results were artificially generated by nonparallel trends in the fertility out-
comes of the treatment and comparison groups, we would expect the differences 
between the level of fertility of the treatment and the two comparison groups to be 
significantly different after the “placebo” reform. The results of this placebo test are 
reported in Table 5 column 1. The coefficients  β 4 and  β 5 are negative, small, and not 
significantly different from zero. We also assess the possibility that our results are 
driven by differences in observable characteristics by using a semiparametric DD 
model. The results, presented in online Appendix C, support our main findings.
We also disregard the possibility that the reduced immigrants’ fertility might be 
the result of economic shocks or policies more or less contemporaneous with the 
citizenship reform (e.g., the Hartz Laws and the reform of the parental leave) hav-
ing a differential effect on treatment and comparison groups. In online Appenidx D, 
we discuss these alternative explanations in great detail. We find no evidence that 
women in the treatment group changed their behavior in the labor market after the 
reform and no evidence of differential changes in the probability that any household 
member is receiving a welfare benefit.
IV. Child Quality
In the next two sections we conduct some further tests of the implications of the 
“quality-quantity” model of human fertility. If the introduction of birthright citizen-
ship represents an increase in the returns to investment in the child’s human capital, 
we can expect an accompanying increase in child quality.
A. Anthropometrics
The Microcensus collects information on weight and height of all household 
members, allowing us to construct the BMI for children potentially affected and 
those not affected by the citizenship reform. Childhood obesity is becoming an 
increasingly relevant issue, and evidence from a variety of European countries (e.g., 
Labree et al. 2011) and the United States (Popkin and Udry 1998) suggests that 
obesity rates are higher among the children of immigrants than among native ones.26 
Parents can reduce the risk of child obesity by improving the quality of nutritional 
intake and encouraging physical activity. In our sample, we find that both for chil-
dren born to German mothers and those born to immigrant mothers, the BMI is 
negatively correlated with household income and mother’s education.
Because of the reduction in fertility documented above, on average, the charac-
teristics of households with a child born in or after 2000 might differ from the char-
acteristics of households whose last child was born in 1999 or before. Therefore, a 
negative estimate of  β 4 and  β 5 in equation (2) might capture two effects: (i) higher 
parental incentives to invest in children granted German nationality at birth, namely 
the effect of an increase in the returns to human capital of children; (ii) change in 
the sample composition driven by the reduction in immigrants’ fertility, the so called 
26 For Germany, Will, Zeeb, and Baune (2005) and Kleiser et al. (2009) find that the probability of being either 
overweight or obese is dramatically higher for children whose parents have an immigrant status.
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“selection effect.” At the end of this section we discuss an exercise that provides 
a lower bound estimate of the former effect. However, we would interpret these 
results as suggestive, rather than causal evidence.
In Figure 3, we plot the average BMI of children aged four and five in the treat-
ment and the two comparison groups for each survey year in which questions on 
weight and height were asked, i.e., 1999, 2003 and 2005. Children in the treatment 
group are citizens only in 2005. Children in the treatment group, on average, display 
much higher BMI than those in the two control groups in 1999 and 2003, but the dif-
ferences are significantly smaller in 2005.27 Formally, we estimate the specification 
in equation (2) using BMI and the indicator for being obese as the dependent vari-
ables. The results are reported in Table 6.28 The first two columns show the results 
for BMI, while the last two columns show those for the obesity dummy. The results 
in columns 1 and 3 are based on the specification without controls, and columns 2 
and 4 provide the full specification. For children affected by the reform, we observe 
a reduction in the BMI of 1.1 and 0.8 points with respect to those born to parents 
in Comparison groups I and II, respectively. The size of the effect corresponds to 
27 A similar picture emerges if instead of BMI we use the probability of being obese, as defined in Section IIB.
28 In this specification, standard errors are clustered at group/cohort level. Since we only have 18 clusters, we 
perform the statistical inference drawing critical values from a t-distribution with nine degrees of freedom, that is 
the number of clusters minus the number of cluster-invariant regressors (see Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008).
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Figure 3. Body Mass Index of Children Age 4–5 by Survey Year
notes: The graphic plots the computed Body Mass Index for children aged four and five years, by survey year. In 
the treatment group, only children aged 4–5 in 2005 are affected by the reform. Comparison group I denotes the 
group where only one parent is a foreign citizen. Comparison group II denotes the group where none of the parents 
is a foreign citizen. 
source: German Microcensus
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approximately one-fifth of 1 standard deviation of the BMI observed in the  treatment 
group for cohorts born before the reform. Results for the specifications that use the 
indicator for being obese as the dependent variable support the  conclusion that there 
has been a substantial improvement in the anthropometric outcomes of immigrant 
children born after 2000.
Immigrant children aged over five in 2005 were not granted citizenship at birth. 
Therefore, if the reduction in BMI is driven by the reform, we would not expect 
the BMI of children aged 6–8 in 2005 to be systematically different from the BMI 
of children aged 6–8 in 2003 and 1999. The results of this falsification exercise are 
presented in Table 6 columns 5 and 6. Both for the BMI and the obesity dummy, the 
coefficients are small and statistically not significant.
The obesity gap between the preschool age children of noncitizens and citizens 
drops significantly for children born in 2000 or immediately afterward compared 
to those born immediately before 2000. However, our results might be reflecting, 
at least partially, changes in the composition of the sample of children belonging to 
the treatment group and born after 2000. This would apply if parents who decided 
Table 6—Health Outcomes
BMI
(1)
BMI
(2)
Obese
(3)
Obese
(4)
BMI
(5)
Obese
(6)
Comparison group I −1.202*** −0.905*** −0.132*** −0.092*** 0.256 0.027
(0.263) (0.244) (0.024) (0.024) (0.400) (0.040)
Comparison group II −1.805*** −1.218*** −0.172*** −0.107*** −0.060 −0.007
(0.262) (0.347) (0.022) (0.028) (0.376) (0.040)
Comparison group I 1.123*** 1.169*** 0.120*** 0.118***
 × born after 2000 (0.274) (0.213) (0.032) (0.032)
Comparison group II 0.816*** 0.883*** 0.074*** 0.079***
 × born after 2000 (0.265) (0.208) (0.030) (0.032)
Comparison group I −0.444 −0.017
 × born after 1997 (0.395) (0.041)
Comparison group II −0.222 0.007
 × born after 1997 (0.347) (0.033)
Sample Age 4–5 Age 4–5 Age 4–5 Age 4–5 Age 6–8 Age 6–8
Controls X X X
Observations 10,991 10,800 10,991 10,800 17,095 17,095
Mean of dep. variable 15.972 15.967 15.972 15.967 16.369 0.097
SD of dep. variable 3.210 3.202 3.210 3.202 2.983 0.296
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group-cohort level in parentheses. Statistical significance based on 
the critical value from a t-distribution with nine degrees of freedom. Comparison groups I and II are defined as in 
Table 1. Born after 2000 is a dummy equal to one if the child was born in 2000 or afterward. In columns 1–4, the 
sample is composed of children aged four and five years old. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is composed of chil-
dren aged 6–8 years old. BMI is constructed using Microcensus data on weight and height. Obese is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the child is classified as obese, according to the cutoff points varying by age and gender 
recommended by the Childhood Obesity Working Group of the International Obesity Task force. In columns 1–4, 
the sample is composed of children aged 4 and 5 years old. In columns 5 and 6, the sample is composed of children 
aged 6–8 years old. Controls include child’s age and gender, child birth cohort dummies, year dummies, mother’s 
age, mother’s education dummies, state of residence dummies, and dummies for whether the mother is German or 
an EU citizen.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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not to have a child after 2000 are the same parents who would have invested less 
in their child’s human capital. We provide an estimate of the effect of citizenship 
rights on health outcomes, which is bounded in order to take account of this possible 
source of bias. Our bounding procedure is in the spirit of Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 
(2009) and Lee (2009) and is presented in online Appendix B, we obtain that the 
higher incentives to invest in the health of citizen children have led to a reduction 
in childhood obesity of at least 3 percentage points. Under the current German sys-
tem, there are no differences in the provision of both child care and essential health 
services—including prenatal and postnatal ones—based on individual citizenship 
status. Therefore, we interpret the reduction in childhood obesity as evidence of 
increased parental attention rather than of a change in the access to health care.
B. social and Behavioral development
In this section, we study whether immigrant children who acquired German citi-
zenship at birth displayed changes in measures of child development, other than the 
anthropometric ones. The KiGGS does collect, among other measures, measures of 
children’s noncognitive skills and well being. The sample size is small compared 
to the Microcensus one. The initial sample consists of 2,663 children aged between 
3 and 5, born between 1997 and 2002.29
We estimate the equation  (2) using two different sets of measures.30 First, in 
order to measure the effect on children’s noncognitive skills, we use answers to 
the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ).31 Parents were asked 25 ques-
tions that measure children’s difficulties in four different domains and their pro-
social behavior. The four different domains for difficulties refer to: (i) emotional 
symptoms; (ii) conduct problems; (iii) hyperactivity; and (iv) peer relationship 
problems. The SDQ also reports a total difficulties score, that is given by the sum of 
the first four scores. The prosocial behavior score is meant to capture the degree of 
helping, cooperation, and altruism. In order to allow for a homogenous interpreta-
tion across all six scores, we invert the prosocial behavior score and call it antisocial 
behavior score. Each score ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating no problems and 
10 indicating severe problems in the respective dimension.
Second, we use parents’ answers to a battery of questions (24 items) belong-
ing to the so-called KINDL-R test developed by Ravens-Sieberer and Bullinger 
(1998), and designed to assess a child’s well-being. The different dimensions of 
the test cover: (i) physical well-being; (ii) emotional well-being; (iii) self-worth; 
(iv) well-being related to the family; (v) well-being related to friends; and 
(vi) well-being related to school. Moreover, the KINDL-R test allows for construc-
tion of an aggregated index signifying a child’s total quality of life. For this  second 
29 For children outside the age range three–five, it is not possible to compare children born before and after the 
German nationality reform.
30 Unlike the Microcensus, the KiGGs does not provide comparable information for education acquired outside 
Germany and does contain information on the federal state of residency. For this reason, the specifications based on 
the KiGGs data do not include controls for mother’s education and state dummies.
31 The SDQ is a behavioral screening questionnaire that was developed by Goodman (1997) and has been 
validated and translated in different languages. Unlike other behavioral tests, it has been shown to be reliable in 
different populations.
58  AmEriCAn EConomiC JournAL: AppLiEd EConomiCs oCToBEr 2014
set of outcomes higher values denote higher child well-being. Each score is defined 
between 0 and 100. For interpretational convenience, we standardize all measures 
for children’s  noncognitive skills and well-being with respect to mean and the 
 standard  deviation of children born before 2000 in households where neither parent 
is a foreign citizen.32
Table 7 presents the results for the SDQ. In at least three of the five domains 
measured by the SDQ, immigrants’ children present a higher number of issues com-
pared to those children with at least one German parent. Differences are particularly 
striking in the indicator that captures peer-related issues, with children with no for-
eign parent displaying a number of issues that is almost 1 standard deviation lower 
than children with no German parent. For those born in 2000 or afterward, the gap 
between children born to German and non-German parents shrinks significantly. 
Column 6 provides a measure of the overall effect of the citizenship reform on 
behavioral and social issues: for children born in 2000 or afterward, the difference in 
the total difficulties score between immigrants’ children and children with only one 
foreign parent shrinks by 0.29 standard deviations. Similarly, the difference between 
32 Also in this case, the statistical inference is based on a t-distribution that accounts for the small number of 
clusters.
Table 7—Behavioral Issues
Emotional
issues
(1)
Verbal
issues
(2)
Hyperactive
issues
(3)
Peer
issues
(4)
Antisocial 
behavior
score
(5)
Total 
difficulties
score
(6)
Comparison group I 0.086 −0.040 −0.189* −0.689** 0.218 −0.299**
(0.124) (0.130) (0.094) (0.246) (0.144) (0.106)
Comparison group II 0.103 −0.287* −0.268* −0.976*** −0.136 −0.504***
(0.158) (0.143) (0.129) (0.220) (0.212) (0.125)
Comparison group I 0.211 −0.060 0.116 0.513* −0.288* 0.292*
 × born after 2000 (0.155) (0.153) (0.088) (0.272) (0.129) (0.131)
Comparison group II 0.065 0.142 0.122 0.384* 0.066 0.264***
 × born after 2000 (0.111) (0.087) (0.071) (0.188) (0.097) (0.051)
Sample Age 3–5
Controls X X X X X X
Observations 2,617 2,617 2,618 2,614 2,622 2,614
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group-cohort level in parentheses. Statistical significance based on 
the critical value from a t-distribution with nine degrees of freedom. Comparison groups I and II are defined as in 
Table 1. Born after 2000 is a dummy equal to one if the child was born in 2000 or afterward. The dependent variables 
are standardized with respect to mean and the standard deviation for children born before 2000 to German parents. 
The table reports the results for the Strength and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) and the the dependent variables 
are defined in such a way that lower values signify a better performance of the child. The Antisocial Behavior Score 
presented in column 5 is created inverting the original prosocial behavior score. The Total Difficulties Score pre-
sented in column 6 is the sum of the dependent variables from columns 1 to 4. Controls include child’s age and 
gender, child birth cohort dummies, year dummies, mother’s age, mother’s education dummies, state of residence 
dummies, and dummies for whether the mother is German or an EU citizen.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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immigrants’ children and children with no foreign parent shrinks by 0.26 standard 
deviations. Both effects are statistically significant.
A similar picture emerges from the measures of well-being in Table 8. Among 
children born before 2000, immigrants’ children display, on average, lower levels 
of well-being compared to children with at least one German parent. Not surpris-
ingly, the difference is particularly large and statistically significant for the variable 
that measures well-being in school. Nevertheless, for those born after 2000, the 
gaps shrink significantly.33 Column 7 displays the results for the variable that aggre-
gates the 6 domains of child well-being: overall the reform leads to an increase in 
the well-being of children born to non-German parents by 0.23 standard deviations 
compared to children with only one foreign parent, and 0.26 standard deviations 
compared to those with no foreign parent.
Overall, the results presented in this section suggest that the citizenship reform 
led to an improvement of the socio-emotional outcomes of children in the treatment 
group. Nevertheless there are two important caveats in their interpretation. First, in 
line with the obesity results, the effects might be explained, at least partially, by the 
selection issue driven by the reduced fertility. Second, since the outcome measures 
33 Both for noncognitive skills and well-being outcomes, we are considering multiple outcomes. We test whether 
the interaction terms for the multiple domains are jointly zero for both comparison groups. For both set of outcomes 
the joint F-test strongly rejects the null hypothesis for the two groups.
Table 8—Well-Being
Well-being:
Body
(1)
Well-being:
Soul
(2)
Well-being:
Self
(3)
Well-being:
Family
(4)
Well-being:
Friends
(5)
Well-being:
School
(6)
Total
well-being
(7)
Comparison group I 0.141 0.041 −0.129 −0.164 0.231 0.528*** 0.152
(0.179) (0.188) (0.209) (0.117) (0.187) (0.105) (0.128)
Comparison group II 0.304 0.049 0.037 −0.153 0.199 0.424*** 0.266
(0.205) (0.184) (0.341) (0.149) (0.155) (0.145) (0.163)
Comparison group I −0.183 −0.283 0.055 0.043 −0.247 −0.496*** −0.231
 × born after 2000 (0.188) (0.203) (0.166) (0.151) (0.223) (0.131) (0.150)
Comparison group II −0.253 −0.231 −0.013 0.050 −0.162 −0.328*** −0.267***
 × born after 2000 (0.162) (0.192) (0.157) (0.096) (0.134) (0.092) (0.069)
Sample Age 3–5
Controls X X X X X X X
Observations 2,567 2,577 2,567 2,598 2,589 2,299 2,585
notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group-cohort level in parentheses. Statistical significance based on 
the critical value from a t-distribution with nine degrees of freedom. Comparison groups I and II are defined as in 
Table 1. Born after 2000 is a dummy equal to one if the child was born in 2000 or afterward. The dependent vari-
ables are standardized with respect to mean and the standard deviation for children born before 2000 to German par-
ents. The table reports the results for the KINDL-R test and higher values denote a higher child well-being. Controls 
include child’s age and gender, child birth cohort dummies, year dummies, mother’s age, mother’s education dum-
mies, state of residence dummies, and dummies for whether the mother is German or an EU citizen.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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are parents-reported, we can not rule out the hypothesis that the reform affected 
parents’ perceptions.
C. Channel: Time with the mother
Previous studies report evidence of a positive relationship between maternal 
employment and childhood obesity (see Anderson, Butcher, and Levine 2003; 
von Hinke Kessler Scholder 2008). Fertig, Glomm, and Tchernis (2009) provide 
 evidence for the US suggesting that the association between maternal employment 
and childhood obesity might be caused by working mothers devoting less time to 
child supervision and meal preparation.34 Although early work (Ruhm 2004) finds 
a negative correlation between maternal employment and child cognitive develop-
ment, the evidence on the short-run effects of female labor force participation on 
noncognitive outcomes is not conclusive (see Almond and Currie 2011 for a recent 
review).
In this section, we test whether the time allocation of immigrant mothers changed 
in response to the presence of at least one German citizen among their offspring. In 
particular, we study whether the number of hours dedicated to childcare, elicited 
from the GSOEP, changed in response to the introduction of birthright citizenship. 
We do not have child specific measures of parental investment, but only a measure 
of the total number of hours of child care spent by mothers and fathers within an 
average week day. In the absence of full reallocation of childcare from noncitizen to 
citizen children, however, mothers in the treatment group whose youngest child was 
born in 2000 or afterward should spend more time childrearing than those whose 
youngest child was born before 2000. Whether the youngest child was born before 
or after 2000 should not matter for those households where at least one parent is a 
German citizen. We restrict our sample to households where the youngest child was 
aged three years old or less.
We use a difference-in-differences specification, and we compare the time allo-
cation of parents whose youngest child was born in or after 2000 with the time 
allocation of parents whose youngest child was born before 2000 in the treatment 
group and in the comparison groups. Estimates are reported in Table 9. The first two 
columns, respectively, without and with controls, show that mothers in the treat-
ment group spend around one and a half hours more per day engaged in childcare 
if their youngest child is a citizen. The size of the effect corresponds to approxi-
mately  one-third of one standard deviation of the dependent variable computed for 
the cohorts in the treatment group born before the reform.35
While the coefficients of fathers are not negligible in size, they are not significant. 
We perform a falsification exercise where we restrict the sample to the parents with 
a youngest child born before 2000, and we compare mothers whose youngest child 
was born after or in 1997 with those whose youngest child was born before 1997. 
34 Cawley and Liu (2007), based on the American Time Use Survey, find that working women spend signifi-
cantly less time grocery shopping, cooking, eating, and playing with their children, and are more likely to buy pre-
pared foods. Their results suggest also that decreased maternal time for childcare is only partly offset by partners.
35 Results are robust to including dummies for the number of children aged between 0 and 6.
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Given that neither children born before nor after, nor in 1997, were affected by the 
reform, we do not expect to find any effect when comparing the time allocation of 
their mothers. The coefficients reported in column 4 are much smaller and not sta-
tistically significant.
Since we document the existence of a substantial increase in the number of 
hours of child care spent by mothers in response to the introduction of birthright 
 citizenship, we then check whether we observe a corresponding reduction in the 
observed number of working hours. While the Microcensus does not provide any 
information on the hours of child care spent by the respondent, it does include the 
self-reported number of hours worked by the respondent in the week before the 
interview. We then adopt the same empirical strategy used in column 1 of Table 9 
and study whether treatment mothers whose youngest child was born in 2000 or 
afterward indeed spend less time in the workplace than those whose youngest child 
Table 9—Parental Investment
Women
childcare
Men
childcare
(3)
Placebo
(4)
Women
working hours
(5)(1) (2)
Comparison group I 2.577*** 2.001*** 0.566* 1.255 −2.083***
(0.584) (0.599) (0.287) (1.199) (0.516)
Comparison group II 2.262*** 1.622*** 0.321 0.72 −1.498**
(0.535) (0.564) (0.193) (1.153) (0.552)
Comparison group I −1.785** −1.517* −0.512 1.921**
 × born after 2000 (0.775) (0.809) (0.323) (0.723)
Comparison group II −1.791*** −1.506** −0.208 2.614***
 × born after 2000 (0.594) (0.600) (0.213) (0.574)
Comparison group I 0.506
 × born after 1997 (1.364)
Comparison group II 0.553
 × born after 1997 (1.224)
Born after 2000 1.295**
(0.533)
Youngest child age dummies X X X X
Time dummies X X X X
Controls X X X X
Observations 5,488 5,441 4,744 2,284 118,521
Mean of dep. variable 9.729 9.738 1.995 9.866 14.594
SD of dep. variable 6.234 6.242 2.232 6.07 17.265
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the group-cohort level in parentheses. Comparison groups I and II are 
defined as in Table 1. Born after 2000 is a dummy equal to one if the child was born in 2000 or afterward. In col-
umns 1 to 4, the data source is the GSOEP. In columns 1, 2, and 4, the dependent variable is the mother’s total num-
ber of hours of child care on an average week day. In column 3, the dependent variable is the father’s total number 
of hours of child care on an average week day, where the youngest child was aged three years old or less. Controls 
include mother’s age, mother’s education dummies, state of residence dummies, and dummies for whether the 
mother is German or an EU citizen. Column 3 also includes father’s age as a control. In column 4 we restrict the 
sample to parents with a youngest child born before 2000, Born after 1997 is a dummy equal to one if the youngest 
child was born from 1997 onward. The results in column 5 are based on the Microcensus. The dependent variable 
is the number of weekly working hours.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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was born before 2000.36 Results are reported in column 5 of Table 9 and seem to 
confirm our  prediction. The increase in the hours of child care spent by mothers 
whose youngest child was affected by the reform is accompanied by a (smaller) 
reduction in the their working hours.37
V. Discussion
Sections III and IV present a fairly large set of results that appear to be consis-
tent with our admittedly stylized version of a “quality-quantity” framework. In this 
section, we discuss more extensively the potential mechanisms through which the 
“quality-quantity” model might operate in our context, and we also consider alterna-
tive mechanisms through which immigrants might adjust their fertility behavior as 
a result of the citizenship law we study. In our opinion, there are at least three mar-
gins along which immigrants might change their behavior in order to improve their 
children’s outcomes: (i) increase in the time devoted to child care, (ii) change in the 
consumption/saving patterns over the life cycle, and (iii) increased cultural assimi-
lation. In Section IVC, we provide evidence that supports the first explanation.
The improvement in child “quality” might, however, also be driven by differ-
ent household consumption decisions. In response to the change in child legal 
status, immigrant parents might increase their expenditure in child-related items. 
Alternatively, parents might allow their children to attend a better school by moving 
to a better (and potentially less segregated) neighborhood. This information is, how-
ever, not present in the Microcensus (or not available to us, as for instance informa-
tion about the neighborhood of residence of the household), therefore we leave the 
investigation of such a mechanism to future research.
We also suggest the possibility that a cultural channel is at work. Immigrants 
might perceive that in order for their children to take better advantage of the new 
opportunities they need to be more integrated with the local culture, and, as a conse-
quence, might decide to assimilate more and converge to natives’ pattern in terms of 
fertility behavior and investment in their children. In our analysis, we are not able to 
separate the “quality-quantity” from a pure cultural channel. However, we are skep-
tical that the latter can fully explain our findings. Cultural norms are very persistent 
over time, and we find unlikely that the citizenship reform we study can lead to the 
rapid change in immigrants’ cultural assimilation needed to explain the fertility drop 
documented in Figure 2.
Alternative mechanisms could be based on an hypothetical relationship between 
the time that parents plan to spend in the host country and citizenship rights of 
children. As a result of the reform, parents may decide to stay longer in Germany 
and this might increase parents’ incentives to invest in their own human capital. If 
the increase in human capital led to an increase in female labor supply, this might 
explain the reduction in fertility. Neither the evidence on return intentions presented 
36 The dependent variable, the number of working hours in the week before the interview, takes value zero if the 
respondent has reported to not be employed in that week.
37 The size of the coefficients in columns 1 and 5 are not immediately comparable as in column 1 the dependent 
variable is hours of child care within an average week day and in column 5 hours of work in the previous week.
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in Figure 1 nor the evidence on female labor supply in online Appendix D sup-
port this hypothesis. Nevertheless, a potential change in immigrants’ expected stay 
in Germany is not orthogonal to the two channels previously highlighted. In fact, 
parents might have changed their planned horizon in Germany either because of a 
stronger assimilation with German culture or because they intend to invest more in 
their children in order to allow them to take advantage of the economic opportunities 
related to German citizenship.
Immigrant parents might have increased their efforts to find a job, learn the 
German language, and minimize their chances of unemployment and welfare depen-
dence in order to be eligible for naturalization under the new rules introduced by 
the 2000 reform. The evidence presented in Table 4 does not provide support to the 
hypothesis that the fertility drop is driven by a change in the naturalization rules for 
adults. We also find no evidence that the probability of receiving a social program 
benefit changes after 2000. Also, in this case, an increased willingness to become 
a German citizen would not be incompatible with the “quality-quantity” model, as 
parents might increase their efforts to become German citizens if they perceive that 
their legal status can facilitate their children’s economic and cultural assimilation.
VI. Conclusion
The results of the investigation in this paper suggest a negative and significant 
effect of birthright citizenship on immigrants’ fertility. We can provide evidence that 
changes in child quality are consistent with the predictions of the “quality-quantity” 
model of human fertility. We find that the effect of the reform is large and statisti-
cally significant only for those households where neither parent is a citizen of an EU 
member state, which are those more likely to benefit from the change in legal status. 
We provide evidence that the obesity gap between preschool-aged children of non-
citizens and citizens drops significantly for children born in 2000 or immediately 
afterward, compared to those born immediately before.
For most of the outcomes considered in this work, the change in the child’s legal 
status at birth determines a convergence of immigrant fertility toward natives’ lev-
els. Therefore, our findings might also be explained, at least partially, by an increase 
in cultural assimilation caused by the reform.
Citizenship rights are often perceived as formal rights. Our results provide evi-
dence instead that, when granted at birth, they can significantly increase the incen-
tives of immigrant parents to invest in their children’s human capital. These effects are 
likely to be stronger in countries where noncitizens have less economic opportunities.
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